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THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

NIC #1161-83
10 February 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH :
SA/DCI/IAS
FROM : Milton Kovner
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
SUBJECT : Briefing Materials for NSC
Meeting on Vice President
Bush's Visit to Europe

Attached are briefing materials for the subject meeting prepared by the DDI (EURA) and this office. The package consists of a brief background paper, issues that need further clarification, excerpts from conversations the Vice President had with key European leaders, and selected cables, including those just received from the Paris meetings.

Mil Kovner
Milton Kovner

Attachments

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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 05307

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY
PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF, ADMIRAL MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL, OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS IN PARIS

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOUR THEMES APPEARED IN THE CONVERSATIONS VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAD WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PRIME MINISTER MAUROY, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AND FINANCE MINISTER DELORS AND IN THE STAFF DISCUSSIONS AROUND THESE MEETINGS:

(A) FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE NEED TO DEPLOY INF TO PREVENT THE SLIDE IN GERMANY TOWARD DEMILITARIZATION AND THE DECOUPLING OF AMERICA FROM EUROPE. THE MITTERRAND

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GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE SS-20, WITHOUT A COUNTERWEAPON IN WESTERN EUROPE, AS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT EUROPE HAS FACED FROM THE USSR. THE PRESSURE FOR ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED BY THE FEAR THAT THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS WILL NOT NECESSARILY PROVOKE A U.S. NUCLEAR RESPONSE. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRAISE FOR THE BUNDESTAG SPEECH WENT DOWN VERY WELL WITH MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON.

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END OF MESSAGE

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FM AIR FORCE TWO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
ZEN/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC (FOR JUDGE CLARK)
BT

SECRET EXDIS WH01103

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER FANFANI

PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT, ADMIRAL MURPHY, AMBASSADOR RABB,
RICHARD BURT, DON GREGG, DENNIS BLAIR, NEIL SEIDEMANN,

ITALIAN PARTICIPANTS: PRIME MINISTER FANFANI, FOREIGN MINISTER
COLOMBO, AND OTHER ASSISTANTS

FEBRUARY 5, 9:00 - 10:15 P.M.

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, DESCRIBED THE PURPOSES
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USURPATION OF THE PUBLIC LEADERSHIP OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE; EXPLAIN-
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2. FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO STATED - THE ITALIAN POSITION ON INF, HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY STOOD FIRMLY BEHIND THE DECEMBER, 1979, DECISION, WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BRINGING THE SOVIET UNION INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ANNOUNCED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESULTS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE DEPLOYMENTS IN ITALY WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE SCHEDULED DATES. ON THE NEGOTIATIONS TRACK, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY AND TO SHOW THE PUBLIC THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE SERIOUS. THE ITALIAN POSITION WAS THE NATO POSITION THAT THE ZERO/ZERO PROPOSAL WAS THE BEST FINAL GOAL. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL, AND HAD PROPOSED A PARTIAL REDUCTION OF THEIR MISSILES IN RETURN FOR A CANCELLATION OF THE PERSHING II AND GLEM DEPLOYMENTS. THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT ACCEPTABLE, AS IT WOULD LEAVE THE SOVIETS WITH A MONOPOLY. TO REMAIN TRUE TO THE ZERO/ZERO PROPOSAL, THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED, WAS TO INSIST ON RECIPROCITY AND PARITY, DEVELOPING NEGOTIATING TACTICS WITH FIRMNESS AND INTELLIGENCE, WHILE SHOWING THE PUBLIC THAT THE U.S. WAS NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY.

3. PRIME MINISTER FANFANI SUPPLEMENTED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT ITALY HAD MAINTAINED ITS CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECEMBER, 1979 DECISION DESPITE FOUR CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT. HE FELT THAT THE POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THAT FIRMNESS WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THE MAJORITY OF PARLIAMENT AND OF ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION UNDERSTOOD THIS NECESSITY.

4. IN REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER FANFANI'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT HE HAD FOUND ON THE EARLIER STOPS ON HIS TRIP, THE VICE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS. HE SAID THAT EARLIER THAT DAY DEFENSE MINISTER WOERNER HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS CHANCELLOR KOHL'S OPINION THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAD REMOVED THE INF ISSUE FROM THE GERMAN ELECTIONS. THE VICE PRESIDENT KNEW THINGS COULD CHANGE, BUT THAT WAS CHANCELLOR

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GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE

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FM AIR FORCE TWO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
ZEN/WHITE HOUSE WASH DC (FOR JUDGE CLARK)
BT

SECRET EXDIS WH01103

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER FANFANI

PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT, ADMIRAL MURPHY, AMBASSADOR RABB,
RICHARD BURT, DON GREGG, DENNIS BLAIR, NEIL SEIDEMANN,

ITALIAN PARTICIPANTS: PRIME MINISTER FANFANI, FOREIGN MINISTER
COLOMBO, AND OTHER ASSISTANTS

FEBRUARY 5, 9:00 - 10:15 P.M.

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, DESCRIBED THE PURPOSES
OF HIS TRIP: CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES; COUNTERACTING ANDROPOV'S
USURPATION OF THE PUBLIC LEADERSHIP OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE; EXPLAIN-
ING THE PURPOSE OF THE ZERO OPTION, AND CONVEYING THE PRESIDENT'S
SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ARMS REDUCTIONS. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT HE HOPED
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3. PRIME MINISTER FANFANI SUPPLEMENTED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT ITALY HAD MAINTAINED ITS CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECEMBER, 1979 DECISION DESPITE FOUR CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT. HE FELT THAT THE POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THAT FIRMNESS WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THE MAJORITY OF PARLIAMENT AND OF ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION UNDERSTOOD THIS NECESSITY.

4. IN REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER FANFANI'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT HE HAD FOUND ON THE EARLIER STOPS ON HIS TRIP, THE VICE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS. HE SAID THAT EARLIER THAT DAY DEFENSE MINISTER WOERNER HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS CHANCELLOR KOHL'S OPINION THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAD REMOVED THE INF ISSUE FROM THE GERMAN ELECTIONS. THE VICE PRESIDENT KNEW THINGS COULD CHANGE, BUT THAT WAS CHANCELLOR

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END OF MESSAGE

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EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY
 PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF, ADMIRAL MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL, OADR
 TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
 SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS IN PARIS

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
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SECRET EXDIS WH01103

EXDIS

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VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER FANFANI

PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT, ADMIRAL MURPHY, AMBASSADOR RABB,
RICHARD BURT, DON GREGG, DENNIS BLAIR, NEIL SEIDEMANN,

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EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY
PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF, ADMIRAL MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL, OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS IN PARIS

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GALBRAITH

END OF MESSAGE

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FM AIR FORCE TWO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC
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EXDIS

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER FANFANI

PARTICIPANTS: VICE PRESIDENT, ADMIRAL MURPHY, AMBASSADOR RABB,
RICHARD BURT, DON GREGG, DENNIS BLAIR, NEIL SEIDEMANN,

ITALIAN PARTICIPANTS: PRIME MINISTER FANFANI, FOREIGN MINISTER
COLOMBO, AND OTHER ASSISTANTS

FEBRUARY 5, 9:00 - 10:15 P.M.

1. THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN HIS OPENING REMARKS, DESCRIBED THE PURPOSES
OF HIS TRIP: CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES; COUNTERACTING ANDROPOV'S
USURPATION OF THE PUBLIC LEADERSHIP OF THE SEARCH FOR PEACE; EXPLAIN-
ING THE PURPOSE OF THE ZERO OPTION, AND CONVEYING THE PRESIDENT'S
SERIOUSNESS ABOUT ARMS REDUCTIONS. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT HE HOPED
DURING THE TRIP TO LAY TO REST THE PERCEPTION THAT THE PRESIDENT

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WAS UNWILLING TO MEET WITH ANDROPOV. THE ITALIAN STOP ON THE TRIP HAD THE ADDED PURPOSE OF EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE STEADFAST SUPPORT THAT ITALY HAD GIVEN TO ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO STATED - THE ITALIAN POSITION ON INF, HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT OF ITALY STOOD FIRMLY BEHIND THE DECEMBER, 1979, DECISION, WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN BRINGING THE SOVIET UNION INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT HAD ANNOUNCED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF RESULTS FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE DEPLOYMENTS IN ITALY WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE SCHEDULED DATES. ON THE NEGOTIATIONS TRACK, THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO NEGOTIATE CONSTRUCTIVELY AND TO SHOW THE PUBLIC THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE SERIOUS. THE ITALIAN POSITION WAS THE NATO POSITION THAT THE ZERO/ZERO PROPOSAL WAS THE BEST FINAL GOAL. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD REJECTED THIS PROPOSAL, AND HAD PROPOSED A PARTIAL REDUCTION OF THEIR MISSILES IN RETURN FOR A CANCELLATION OF THE PERSHING II AND GLEM DEPLOYMENTS. THIS WAS CLEARLY NOT ACCEPTABLE, AS IT WOULD LEAVE THE SOVIETS WITH A MONOPOLY. TO REMAIN TRUE TO THE ZERO/ZERO PROPOSAL, THE FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED, WAS TO INSIST ON RECIPROCITY AND PARITY, DEVELOPING NEGOTIATING TACTICS WITH FIRMNESS AND INTELLIGENCE, WHILE SHOWING THE PUBLIC THAT THE U.S. WAS NEGOTIATING SERIOUSLY.

3. PRIME MINISTER FANFANI SUPPLEMENTED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT ITALY HAD MAINTAINED ITS CONSISTENT SUPPORT FOR BOTH TRACKS OF THE DECEMBER, 1979 DECISION DESPITE FOUR CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT. HE FELT THAT THE POLICY WOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE SUPPORT IN THE FUTURE. HE SAID THAT FIRMNESS WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT THE MAJORITY OF PARLIAMENT AND OF ITALIAN PUBLIC OPINION UNDERSTOOD THIS NECESSITY.

4. IN REPLY TO PRIME MINISTER FANFANI'S QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT HE HAD FOUND ON THE EARLIER STOPS ON HIS TRIP, THE VICE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS. HE SAID THAT EARLIER THAT DAY DEFENSE MINISTER WOERNER HAD TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS CHANCELLOR KOHL'S OPINION THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT HAD REMOVED THE INF ISSUE FROM THE GERMAN ELECTIONS. THE VICE PRESIDENT KNEW THINGS COULD CHANGE, BUT THAT WAS CHANCELLOR

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KOHL'S CURRENT ASSESSMENT. CHANCELLOR KOHL WAS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO DEPLOYMENT OF NATO INF IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT, AND FELT THAT ONLY THE COMMITMENT TO DEPLOYMENT WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE SUCCESS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IN THE NETHERLANDS, SAID THE VICE PRDSIDENT, THE SITUATION WAS MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER THE DUTCH HAD MADE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WHICH WERE IN LINE WITH DECEMBER, 1979, DECISION AND HAD NOT DISAGREED WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESENTATION OF THE U.S. POSITION ON THE ISSUES.

5. PRIME MINISTER FANFANI ASKED ABOUT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, NOTING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED SOME DISTURBING REPORTS EARLIER THAT EVENING. THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THESE REPORTS, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO ENSURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, FOLLOWED BY A RAPID TRANSITION TO WORK ON THE BROADER PEACE PLAN WHICH HE HAD OUTLINED IN HIS SPEECH OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1982. THE VICE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT PHILIP HABIB WOULD BE RETURNING TO THE MIDDLE EAST SOON TO WORK FOR THESE GOALS WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT THE THREE OUTPOSTS WHICH ISRAEL WAS DEMANDING TO RETAIN IN LEBANON WERE UNACCEPTABLE.

6. FOREIGN MINISTER COLOMBO SAID THAT DELAYS IN WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM LEBANON, AND THE RESUMPTION OF LOCAL FEUDS IN THAT COUNTRY WERE MAKING THE SITUATION WORSE DAY BY DAY. HE FEARED A MAJOR OUTBREAK IN VIOLENCE IN THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS UNLESS SOME PROGRESS WERE MADE RAPIDLY. ITALY HAD RECEIVED A REQUEST FROM LEBANON TO INCREASE ITS FORCES ON DUTY WITH THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, BUT HAD REPLIED THAT IT WOULD TAKE ACTION ONLY IN CONCERT WITH THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE MNF.

7. THE VICE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS HIGH ON THE LIST OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES.

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FOR THE SECRETARY
PASS TO VICE PRESIDENT'S CHIEF OF STAFF, ADMIRAL MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL, OADR
TAGS: OVIP (BUSH, GEORGE)
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETINGS IN PARIS

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOUR THEMES APPEARED IN THE CONVERSATIONS VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAD WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND, PRIME MINISTER MAUROY, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON AND FINANCE MINISTER DELORS AND IN THE STAFF DISCUSSIONS AROUND THESE MEETINGS:

(A) FIRST AND FOREMOST, THE NEED TO DEPLOY INF TO PREVENT THE SLIDE IN GERMANY TOWARD DEMILITARIZATION AND THE DECOUPLING OF AMERICA FROM EUROPE. THE MITTERRAND

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GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE SS-20, WITHOUT A COUNTERWEAPON IN WESTERN EUROPE, AS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT EUROPE HAS FACED FROM THE USSR. THE PRESSURE FOR ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE GREATLY INCREASED BY THE FEAR THAT THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS WILL NOT NECESSARILY PROVOKE A U.S. NUCLEAR RESPONSE. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRAISE FOR THE BUNDESTAG SPEECH WENT DOWN VERY WELL WITH MITTERRAND AND CHEYSSON.

(B) SECONDLY, THE FRENCH SEEMED QUITE ANXIOUS TO EXPLAIN THE SUCCESSES OF THIS SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, AS IF THEY FEARED THE U.S. WAS LOSING CONFIDENCE IN THE SOCIALIST ABILITY TO GOVERN. MAUROY IN PARTICULAR WENT INTO CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC DETAIL ON PROGRESS IN SUCH THINGS AS LOWERING INFLATION AND STABILIZING UNEMPLOYMENT.

(C) THE FRENCH WERE ALSO ANXIOUS TO ENCOURAGE A U.S.-LED ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THERE WAS A SLIGHT WHIFF OF BLACKMAIL IN DELORS' AND MAUROY'S ASSERTIONS THAT THE PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUROPE MIGHT PREVAIL UNLESS THE U.S. QUICKLY STIMULATED A WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC RECOVERY. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO WAS NOT ELABORATED, ALTHOUGH IT SHOWS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE FRENCH WILL GO TO PRESS US ON THIS VITAL CONCERN OF THEIRS. SPECIFICALLY, FRANCE WANTS US TO POUR BILLIONS INTO THE THIRD WORLD (FRANCE'S MARKET) AND THUS BRING ABOUT A KEYNESIAN RECOVERY LED BY THIRD WORLD CONSUMPTION.

(D) THERE WAS SOME TALK OF PROTECTIONISM AND THE VICE PRESIDENT SUCCESSFULLY CONTRASTED A PROTECTIONIST CONGRESS WITH THE PRESIDENT'S DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN FREE TRADE. THE FRENCH ADMITTED THAT THERE WERE PROTECTIONIST FORCES AT WORK IN FRANCE, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR NEED TO PROMOTE EXPORTS AND THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE COMMON MARKET MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR FRANCE SERIOUSLY TO CLOSE OTHERS OUT OF FRANCE. ATTALI AND VERNIER-PALETZ RAISED THE SPECTER OF THE JAPANESE AND IMPLIED THAT A LITTLE COMMON CAUSE BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE U.S. AGAINST THE JAPANESE MIGHT BE INDICATED. WE BRUSHED THAT OFF. CHEYSSON EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST NOT LET COMMERCIAL DIFFERENCES INTERFERE WITH THE ALLIANCE, ESPECIALLY WITH

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DEPLOYMENT. WHEREUPON, HE ACCUSED US OF "AGGRESSION"
IN SELLING FLOUR TO EGYPT.

3. AT ONE POINT CHEYSSON CATEGORICALLY AND VIGOROUSLY
DENIED TO ME THAT A MITTERRAND VISIT WITH ANDROPOV WAS
IN THE OFFING.

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT ALSO HAD A BRIEF CHAT WITH
MOD HERNU IN THE CAR TO THE AIRPORT ABOUT THE SITUATION
IN LEBANON. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES
IN THE PEACE MOVEMENT. THE VICE PRESIDENT CONGRATULATED
HERNU ON THE GOOD FRANCO-AMERICAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS
THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AT ALL LEVELS.

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